The Lebanese crisis has receded from the headlines but has not gone away. Today, all eyes are on the presidential election, the latest arena in the ongoing struggle between pro- and anti-government forces. Yet even if a compromise candidate is found, none of the country’s underlying problems will have been addressed, chief among them the status of Hizbollah’s weapons. If the election is to be more than a mere prelude to the next showdown, all parties and their external allies need to move away from maximalist demands and agree on a package deal that accepts for now Hizbollah’s armed status while constraining the ways in which its weapons can be used.
Looking back over the past ten months, Lebanese can feel somewhat relieved. The massive demonstrations in December 2006, followed by a general strike and clashes between pro- and anti-government forces with strong sectarian overtones as well as a series of assassinations and car bombs brought the nation perilously close to breakdown. State institutions are virtually paralysed; the government barely governs; the economic crisis is deepening; mediation efforts have failed; political murders continue; and militias, anticipating possible renewed conflict, are rearming. Still, fearful of the consequences of their own actions, leaders of virtually every shade took a welcome step back.
An important explanation lies in Hizbollah’s realisation that its efforts to bring down the government carried dangerous consequences. Facing calls for its disarming and denunciations of its (allegedly foreign-inspired) adventurism in triggering the July 2006 war, the movement concluded that the government of Prime Minister Siniora and its backers were hostile actors intent on cutting it down to size and further aligning Lebanon with the West. As a result, it carried the fight squarely on the domestic scene, removing Shiite ministers, taking to the streets and pushing for the government’s ouster. This resort to street politics was risky and ultimately self-defeating. At almost every social level, Shiite support for Hizbollah has solidified, a result of both the movement’s longstanding efforts to consolidate its hold over the community and a highly polarised post-war environment. Former Shiite adversaries are, for the time being, silencing their differences, viewing the movement’s weapons as their best defence in an environment where Shiites feel besieged both from within and without.
But while the movement demonstrated its mobilisation capacity and enjoyed support from an important segment of the Christian community, its use of an essentially Shiite base to bring down a Sunni-dominated government reinforced sectarian loyalties. Sunnis and many Christians were alarmed at Hizbollah’s might and ability unilaterally to trigger a devastating confrontation; they increasingly saw it as a Shiite not national movement and as advancing an Iranian or Syrian not Lebanese agenda. In short, while the movement sought to highlight the conflict’s political stakes, the street battles quickly morphed into confessional ones, forcing Hizbollah into a sectarian straitjacket and threatening to distract it from its primary objectives..
Hizbollah faces other dilemmas. Deployment of the army and of a reinforced UN force at the Israeli border have significantly reduced its military margin of manoeuvre. The movement’s Shiite social base also is exhausted and war-weary, a result of Israel’s intensive campaign. Sectatarian tensions restrict Shiites’ capacity to take refuge among other communities in the event of renewed confrontation with Israel. Hizbollah thus has been forced into a defensive mode, prepared for conflict but far from eager for it.
Hizbollah appears to be in search of a solution that defuses sectarian tensions and reflects its new military posture. Its discomfort presents an opportunity to make some progress on the question of its armed status. Of course, Hizbollah will not compromise at any price. Its priorities are clear: to maintain its weapons and protect Lebanon as well as the Middle East from Israeli and U.S. influence through a so-called axis of refusal that includes Iran, Syria and Hamas. Should it feel the need, it likely would perpetuate Lebanon’s political paralysis, even at the cost of further alienating non-Shiites; mobilise its constituents, even at the risk of reducing itself ever more to a sectarian movement; and protect Syrian or Iranian interests, even at the expense of its national reputation.
Lebanese parties and their foreign allies should seek a package deal on a domestic arrangement that, while postponing the question of Hizbollah’s weapons, restricts their usage – in other words, that neither resolves nor ignores the problem. The elements of the deal will be neither easy to negotiate nor a panacea, and they will provide at best a temporary reprieve. Without fundamental political reform, Lebanon’s political system -- based on power-sharing between sectarian factions – inevitably will encourage cyclic crises, governmental deadlock, unaccountability and sectarianism. More importantly, the country’s future is intricately tied to the regional confrontation that plunged it into armed conflict with Israel, paralysed its politics and brought it to the brink of renewed civil war. There can be no sustainable solution for Lebanon without a solution that addresses those issues as well – beginning with relations between the U.S., Israel, Syria and Iran.
Recommendations
To the Lebanese political parties and concerned foreign governments, including the U.S., France, Syria and Iran:
1. Seek a way out of the Lebanese political crisis by negotiating, or encouraging negotiation of a package deal that includes the following elements:
a) a consensual presidential choice (ie., a two-thirds vote in parliament) to avoid the dangers of a presidential vacuum and the perils of dual government;
b) adoption of a ministerial declaration that meets all sides’ core interests by
i. accepting the principle of resistance but only as a transitional phase leading to the implementation of a proper national defence strategy, and restricting its use to defensive purposes (i.e, in the event of foreign aggression); and
ii. giving diplomacy a chance to resolve the question of the disputed Shebaa Farms area through a moratorium on armed action in that area;
iii. accepting UN Security Council Resolution 1701 as well as the international tribunal dealing with the Hariri assassination;
iv. calling for normalisation of relations with Syria through opening of embassies, demarcation of boundaries and resolution of the case of Lebanese disappeared; and
c) a collective agreement to freeze the ongoing military build-up and de-escalate the war of words, in particular in the media.
To the next Lebanese Government:
2. Renew discussions with all political parties on a national defence strategy.
3. Make the Shebaa Farms a priority, focusing at first on a solution involving temporary UN custody.
4. Start addressing the political system’s weaknesses by adopting a new, more equitable electoral law and reappointing a constitutional council.
To Hizbollah:
5. Address fears among other communities by :
a) adopting a new charter to replace the 1985 founding document, which calls for the establishment of an Islamic state;
b) clarifying its position vis-à-vis the state and publicising the specific reforms it advocates;
c) unambiguously accepting the above-mentioned package deal, in particular by pledging to act solely in a defensive capacity and abiding by a moratorium on military operations in the Shebaa farms; and
d) lifting the siege of the prime minister’s offices.
To Syria:
6. Address Lebanese concerns by making clear willingness to normalise relations by exchanging embassies, demarcating the boundary, forsaking direct political or military interference and relying strictly on legitimate tools (i.e. its historic Lebanese allies and Lebanon’s dependence on Syria for trade) in dealing with its neighbour.
To Israel:
7. Agree to turn the Shebaa Farms over to UN custody as a temporary measure.
8. Avoid intrusions into Lebanese airspace and other provocative acts.
Beirut/ Brussels, 10 October 2007
