Dr. Gil Feiler
Suwayda governorate in southern Syria—known historically as Jabal al‑Druze—is home to around 700,000 members of the Druze religious minority. While Druze in Israel are well-integrated, those in Syria have long sought autonomy from central regimes in Damascus. Since the collapse of Bashar al‑Assad in December 2024, regional tensions have intensified, driven by competing Druze visions for Syria’s future, local rivalries with Sunni Bedouin tribes, and external interventions.
In early 2025, Druze militias in Suwayda formed the Suwayda Military Council (SMC), an umbrella coalition of local armed groups led by former Syrian army officer Tareq al‑Shoufi. The council emerged with aspirations of local autonomy, coordination with Syria’s new interim leadership under President Ahmed al‑Sharaa, and alignment with other decentralized forces such as the Kurdish-led SDF. It has drawn in groups like Men of Dignity and the Ahrar Jabal al‑Arab Gathering.
However, Druze religious leadership is divided: Sheikh Hikmat al‑Hijri, one of Syria’s three Druze “sheikhs al‑Aql,” rejects cooperation with the central government and accuses Damascus of complicity in massacres of Druze civilians. He frames the struggle as existential for his community and supports federalist or even secessionist tendencies.
By contrast, Sheikh Youssef Jarbou, another spiritual leader, endorses integration with Damascus, backs cooperation with security forces, and supports initiatives for religious delegation visits—including one to Israel in March 2025—believing in working within state structures.
This internal rift shapes the region’s politics: while some factions lean toward relative autonomy, others push for union with central authority.
Local Spark: Druze vs. Bedouin Clashes
Tensions escalated in July 2025 following tit-for-tat kidnappings between local Sunni Bedouin tribes and Druze militias, especially those allied with Hikmat al‑Hijri. Violence quickly spiraled into widespread street fighting, ambushes, and retaliatory raids in and around Suwayda city.
Government forces were deployed to restore order. Promised ceasefires collapsed rapidly, with both sides accusing each other of violations. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reported anywhere from 100 to over 360 dead in initial days, including civilians and security personnel.
The Syrian transitional government under President al‑Sharaa initially deployed troops into Suwayda city to intervene. But they soon faced accusations—from Druze leaders and independent monitors—of extrajudicial killings and targeting of Druze civilians. Field executions by individuals identified as government-affiliated or security forces were widely reported, including summary shootings near Suwayda and Harvest Guest House, with many victims in civilian clothing.
President al‑Sharaa publicly condemned violence, announced investigations into human rights offenses by troops or militias, and pledged accountability. He also announced plans to turn security control over to Druze elders and local factions under a broader ceasefire framework.
Israeli Intervention
On July 15, Israel launched airstrikes near Damascus and Suwayda, claiming to protect Syria’s Druze community—a group with which it shares close ties. Initial strikes hit Syrian military vehicles and the defence ministry complex in Damascus. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said its aim was to prevent government forces from harming Druze civilians and to establish a buffer zone in southern Syria.
Israel’s actions created regional controversy. Critics linked the interventions to geopolitical motives and a broader strategy to weaken Damascus. Many Druze in Syria saw Israel’s involvement with suspicion, arguing it was more self-serving than protective .
Escalation: Mass Displacement and Executions
As fighting intensified, reports emerged of Druze militias—particularly those loyal to Sheikh al-Hijri—carrying out mass executions of Bedouin men, burning villages, and forcibly displacing entire Bedouin communities. Accounts describe mutilations, rape of women and children, and villages emptied of inhabitants. Over 130,000 people fled their homes amid what the UN called a humanitarian crisis. Human Rights Watch and UN officials demanded investigations into the atrocities.
Among the victims were a Syrian‑American Druze family—including Hossam Saraya, a U.S. citizen from Oklahoma—abducted and executed; his case drew international attention and condemnation, and congressional requests for clarity.
By this point, the death toll reached several hundred, and Al Jazeera reported over 300 fatalities, while other sources suggested numbers closer to or exceeding 600.
Ceasefire and Current Stakes
By mid‑July, a mediated ceasefire—brokered by Turkey, Jordan, the U.S., and Arab states—called for Syrian troops to withdraw from Suwayda city and hand over local security to Druze clerics and factions. Jordan and Turkey supported local ownership of security to avoid future violence.
While an official ceasefire holds for now, its durability is uncertain:
1. Community divisions remain deep, with local factions loyal to al‑Hijri rejecting prior agreements and insisting on continuing autonomy efforts
2. Turkey has warned that it may intervene if autonomy within Syria becomes a breaking point, rejecting any fragmentation of the state. Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan called Israeli involvement destabilizing and confirmed Ankara’s readiness to act in defense of Syrian unity
3. President al‑Sharaa’s ability to reassert centralized governance remains fragile, as minority communities fear a repeat of past repression or exclusion from national decisions. Confidence in the transitional regime has eroded, particularly after reports of violence in the coastal Alawite region and now Suwayda.
Why Are They Fighting?
Several overlapping factors explain the conflict:
Historical mistrust: The Druze community has long been wary of Damascus, especially since the brutality of Assad-era repression. Post‑2024, many reject rule by outsiders while still debating the degree of possible integration .
Internal leadership divisions: Clash between figures like Hikmat al-Hijri (autonomy) and Youssef Jarbou (integration) creates factional competition that influences militia behavior and alliances.
Local tribal conflicts: Druze–Bedouin animosities go back years, spiking now over resources, territory, and the power vacuum left by Assad’s fall .
Regional geopolitics: Israel’s intervention—partly shaped by its Druze population and broader goals of limiting Damascus—complicates alliances. Meanwhile, Turkey rejects decentralization that could inspire Kurdish or Druze autonomy   .
Security and governance contest: Both central government and local actors vie to control public order in Suwayda. The central authority fears fragmentation; local armed councils seek autonomy and representation in a future Syrian state.
Broader Implications
The battles in Suwayda are emblematic of Syria’s fragile post‑Assad transition. Similar dynamics—ethnic or sectarian tensions, distrust of central governance, competing visions for future state structure—are playing out in Kurdish northeast Syria, Daraa, and coastal regions. The potential for renewed civil war remains high if political solutions fail.
For the Druze specifically, the conflict is both existential and ideological: will they remain a self-ruled bastion inside a unified Syria? Or risk violent fragmentation? The internal split among leadership, the memory of past massacres, and external actors’ interference make the future precarious.
President al‑Sharaa’s promises of inclusive governance and justice seem undercut by allegations of security abuses by forces loyal to him. Without genuine reconciliation, accountability, and power-sharing, sectarian violence may persist.
Outlook
Suwayda’s situation remains volatile. Key challenges ahead include: Can the ceasefire hold long term? Will Druze local leaders agree to remain within a unified Syria? Can central authorities credibly control abuses and incorporate Druze into state institutions? Will external powers—Turkey, Israel, regional Arab states—stabilize or further fragment southern Syria?
In the absence of deeper political compromise, community trust, and inclusive governance frameworks, what started as tribal retribution and local power struggles in Suwayda risks morphing into another arena of sectarian conflict in post‑Assad Syria.
