By Terry Lacey*
A survey by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey research conducted March 5-7 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shows that the popularity of Hamas rose sharply after the Israel-Gaza war. (Reuters Jakarta Post 10.03.09)
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh could beat Mahmoud Abbas in a Presidential election and Hamas could win a general election, outright, or as a leading coalition partner. Support for Haniyeh and Hamas has risen in three months from 38 percent to 47 percent, and that for Abbas and Fatah fell from 48 to 45 percent.
However, Marwan Barghouti, the popular jailed Fatah leader, could win 61 percent of a Presidential poll if released, but Hamas might still win the general election. Support for Fatah declined from 42 to 40 percent, while Hamas rose from 28 to 33 percent. But Fatah retained the most support for any one party in the polls.
Now, read in-between the lines of the above statement, which is where interesting facts in the Middle East are often located. This must mean the capacity of Hamas to win elections in Palestine, as it did in 2006, must depend on its ability to attract voters who are not Hamas supporters.
Now isn’t that interesting, and why on earth would that be ?
Partly, because its administration of charitable services to victims of occupation has been well organized, and it has acquired a reputation for honesty and efficiency. Also although built upon Islamic identity, its religious support has been broad from conservative to liberal, and for wider reasons it also attracted secular support.
Hamas also gained from the protest vote against Israeli occupation, and especially over the Gaza war. Firstly it gained respect for leading resistance. Secondly for opposing signing up prematurely to peace deals perceived to bring no practical gains for most Palestinians.
This last point presents strikingly similar logic to that of Israeli voters for Likud and Yisrael Beiteinu, who also fail to perceive clear benefits from peace deals.
There are wider underlying reasons why Israeli propaganda seeking to label Hamas as terrorist does not work with Palestinian voters, quite apart from the support it accrues for not giving up the right to resist too soon.
Hamas is seen as part of the future, and not part of the past. Hamas is structured as a more modern political party than Fatah and the PLO factions, and is part of a wider process of Muslim modernization.
Hamas is typical of the rise of political Islam, which we can also see in Turkey, Indonesia, and Malaysia as well as Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries. Typically such parties are based on ideology, on party programs, and on branches or cells, contrasting to networks of patron-client relationships built round big families and clans which carve up business opportunities and bureaucratic jobs.
Even though most Palestinians realize that a Hamas victory for the Presidency or the general elections, or both, might mean a tighter Israeli blockade against Gaza, there is still quite a chance that Hamas will win any forthcoming elections, even though many Palestinians believe a Fatah victory might lead to ending the blockade.
Since 46 percent of Palestinians now rate Palestinian reunification as a priority, democratic elections could see Marwan Barghouthi emerge as President co-habiting alongside a Hamas-Fatah coalition.
Either the reunification of Palestine will lead to an elected Palestinian political leadership, at the very least strongly influenced by Hamas, or the remnants of Palestine will institutionalize into two non-viable cantons, appended to Israel.
In both cases Palestinians and Israelis are more likely to support an interim deal, a modus operandi and economic co-operation, rather than being pushed into premature comprehensive peace talks.
This is not the time to push the twin state solution as it could easily be defeated in any referendums held in Palestine and Israel in present circumstances.
* Terry Lacey is a development economist who writes from Jakarta on modernization in the Muslim world, investment and trade relations with the EU and Islamic banking.
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