Sanctions against Iran Now Imminent

Published November 26th, 2009 - 02:42 GMT


A History of Iran’s Defiance of Nuclear Negotiations
Expert Sources on Iran

 

A day before the UN Security Council is to meet in Brussels Nov. 20 to consider tough new sanctions against Iran, President Obama said the measures could be imposed in the next few weeks if the Islamic Republic continues its intransigence.[1]

Unless Iran changes course, Obama said during a speech Nov. 19 in Seoul, South Korea, "Over the next several weeks, we will be developing a package of potential steps that we could take, that would indicate our seriousness to Iran."[2] The P5+1 – the United States, Russia, China, Britain, France plus Germany – last met in Geneva Oct. 1 to offer a proposal in which Iran would send its uranium for enrichment to Russia and China.[3]

On Nov. 18, Iran indicated that it would not agree to the plan.[4]

In the meantime, Rep. Howard Berman, D-Calif., chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, gained support for tougher sanctions on Iran through the Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act. The act was approved Oct. 28. The following day, the Senate’s Banking Committee approved a set of sanctions that went even further. The full House may soon begin discussions of the Sanctions Act.[5]

Officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have said the latest revelation of a once-secret nuclear enrichment site near the Iranian city of Qom may mean Iran is developing other such sites.[6] IAEA inspectors returned Oct. 29 to their Vienna headquarters after visiting the Qom facility to determine whether the plant is part of a military nuclear program, and will report to the IAEA Board of Governors at its Nov. 26-27 meeting.[7]

Please see below for a comprehensive history of Iran’s defiance of nuclear negotiations.


A History of Iran’s Defiance of Nuclear Negotiations

In December 2002, a senior Iranian diplomat denied the Islamic Republic had a nuclear weapons program.[8]  But in August 2002 Iranian dissidents revealed that Iran had a secret nuclear energy program and was in the process of building two facilities capable of producing material for a nuclear weapon.[9] A month later, Iran told the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its plans to advance its nuclear program, specifically saying that it was “embarking on a long term plan to construct nuclear power plants.â€[10]

Soon after, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei and other key officials traveled to Iran and discovered “extensive concealment activities†regarding Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs.[11] This raised great concern among world leaders, the IAEA and the UN because Iran had not fulfilled its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). To date, Iran has ignored the international community’s concerns, prompting leaders of several countries to speak out.

“It is in the interest of Iran to choose the path of dialogue and give up its nuclear ambitions,†French Defense Minister Herve Morin said.[12]

Said German Chancellor Angela Merkel, “Iran’s nuclear program is one of our biggest security policy concerns.â€[13]

International Atomic Energy Agency: Iran Working Towards Nuclear Weapon

At a meeting of international representatives in Vienna on Feb. 25, chief UN nuclear inspector Olli Heinonen submitted evidence that Iran was working on projects "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon."[14]

Heinonen also presented a video of Iran’s efforts to design a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3, an intermediate-range ballistic missile capable of hitting Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East.[15] On July 9, Iran tested its medium-range ballistic missiles, including the Shahab-3.[16]

Heinonen also reported that Iran was testing high-intensity explosives necessary for a nuclear detonation around the town of Parchin, 21 miles (35 km) from Tehran.[17] The Iranian government claimed that the tests were for the purpose of improving the design of airbags.[18]

U.S. Intelligence

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran stated with a high degree of certainty that the Iranian military was working to develop nuclear weapons and its nuclear proliferation program in 2003.[19]

The report also stated that after 2003, there was a high probability that nuclear weapons development was halted for at least several years.[20] Intelligence sources also indicated at the time that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon.[21] Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell repudiated the report, saying that more analysis was needed to establish if the nuclear program  was continuing under the guise of a civilian one.[22] 

However, McConnell warned that “In our judgment, only an Iranian political decision to abandon a nuclear weapons objective would plausibly keep Iran from eventually producing nuclear weapons—and such a decision is inherently reversible" and indeed Iran resumed its uranium enrichment activities in January 2006.[23] Uranium enrichment is necessary for the production of weapons-grade uranium.

According to the NIE, Iran would have the ability to manufacture a nuclear weapon in late 2009,[24] but that it was more likely to be capable of producing the requisite amount of highly enriched uranium between 2010 and 2015.[25]

McConnell, said on Feb. 26, "Our estimate is [that the Iranians] intend to have a nuclear weapon."[26]

Iran’s Culture of Negotiation and its Impact on Iran’s Nuclear Program

Iran’s negotiating style is an important aspect of the country’s continued nuclear ambitions.

Iranian government negotiators are known for their ambiguity.[27] This is, at least in part, a product of Iranian cultural and religious norms.[28] This legacy does not preclude sincerity in negotiations, but it does mean that initial bargaining positions often fail to reflect actual Iranian goals in the negotiating process.[29]

Iranians use a variety of tactics to gauge the determination of their opponents. They typically engage in extensive pre-negotiations, discussing marginal issues as a strategy to gain information about the other side.[30] Negotiators in inferior power positions sometimes deny even the most incontrovertible truths to throw opposing negotiators off-balance.[31]

One particularly frustrating trait for Western negotiators is the Iranian preference for keeping the duration of agreements short, which conflicts with common Western strategies of confidence-building and commitment.

Recent works by American researchers document in detail the failure of American attempts to engage the Islamic regime through diplomacy, from the fall of the Shah until the present day.[32] Two works in particular, one written by a former CIA analyst and the other by an academic, suggest that Iranian leaders have interpreted American attempts at diplomatic engagement as a sign of American weakness.[33]

The timeline below details the failures of years of multilateral diplomacy aimed at dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While conducting these negotiations, Iran has continued to act belligerently, threatening to attack oil facilities, U.S. assets and Israel. Moreover, IAEA inspectors have suggested that Iran is simultaneously developing armaments capable of carrying and detonating a nuclear payload.


Timeline: Iran Nuclear Negotiations and Actions

Aug. 21, 2009: Iran grants IAEA inspectors access to its almost-completed Arak nuclear reactor, as well as increased monitoring of the Natanz uranium enrichment site. [34]

June 5, 2009: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports a total of 7,052 centrifuges with 4,920 already enriching uranium and 2,132 ready to begin uranium enrichment.[35]

June 5, 2009: Iran’s production rate of 2.75 kilograms per day of low-enriched uranium (LEU) would accumulate enough weapon-grade uranium to create two nuclear weapons by February 2010. If all reported 7,052 centrifuges were used, this could happen as early as mid-December 2009.[36]

June 5, 2009: Iran still refuses the IAEA access to the IR-40 reactor currently under construction at Arak and design plans for another reactor in Darkhovin. Access to the reactor at Arak has been denied since August 2008, preventing the IAEA from monitoring the uranium enrichment progress.[37]

Feb. 19, 2009: The IAEA reports that Iran has produced a total of 2,227 pounds (1,010 kilograms) of low-enriched uranium. This is a third more than Iran’s previously disclosed figure. United Nations officials attributed the 460-pound (209 kilograms) discrepancy to measurement errors. The report also found a total of 5,600 centrifuges, significantly more than the 3,800 centrifuges previously listed. [38]

Aug. 30, 2008: Iran’s centrifuges are operating at 85 percent of their total capacity.[39]

July 9, 2008: Iran tests nine medium- to long-range missiles capable of hitting Israel and U.S. military bases in the region.[40]

July 4, 2008: Iran offers a formal response to the UN’s June 16 negotiation proposal. While indicating Iran’s willingness to negotiate, the response fails to address the central issue of whether Iran would freeze its uranium enrichment activities.[41]

June 18, 2008: Iran forwards to the IAEA the text of its proposed package for constructive negotiations. The proposal presents a number of issues that Iran believes should comprise a framework for negotiations. These include security, regional and international developments, nuclear energy, terrorism, democracy, drug control, environmental conservation, and economic, technological, and commercial energy cooperation.[42]

June 16, 2008: The five permanent members of the UN Security Council, along with Germany, offer Iran a broad framework for negotiations on issues ranging from nuclear energy to agriculture, civil aviation, and infrastructure. This is done on the condition that Iran freezes its enrichment-related and reprocessing activities at their current rate of development – implicitly accepting the idea of a nuclear Iran.[43]

May 26, 2008: Mohamed El Baradei, director general of the IAEA, circulates a report to the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.[44] The report finds that Iran is withholding information critical for determining whether it is trying to produce nuclear weapons: specifically, Iranian work on high-explosive testing, missile design and the “green salt project†- undeclared studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4 (“green saltâ€).[45]

March 28, 2008: Iran issues a statement in response to UN Security Council Resolution 1803 in which it affirms its inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It further claims that the United States and three European countries provided “false and erroneous†information to the IAEA concerning Iran’s nuclear program, and that the actions taken by the Security Council contradict the UN Charter and are in violation of “peremptory norms of international law.â€[46]

March 3, 2008: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1803, implementing a new round of sanctions against Iran for its continued refusal to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy water-related (a commonly used moderator in nuclear reactors) activity. The resolution calls for states to exercise “vigilance and restraint†in dealing with the transit through their territories of individuals, material and equipment related to the Iranian nuclear program. It also extends the freezing of assets belonging to persons or entities supporting Iran’s nuclear activity and calls upon states to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories that do business with Iranian banks.[47]

Feb. 25, 2008: Olli Heinonen, chief U.N. nuclear inspector, organizes a meeting of international representatives on Feb. 25 in Vienna at which he submits video evidence that Iran is working on projects "not consistent with any application other than the development of a nuclear weapon."[48] Heinonen also reveals at the Feb. 25 meeting that Iran has been testing high-intensity explosives necessary for a nuclear detonation around the town of Parchin, 21 miles (35 km) from Tehran.[49]

Jan. 24, 2008: The UN Security Council agrees to impose a new set of sanctions on Iran.[50]

Dec. 3, 2007: The U.S. National Intelligence Council releases an unclassified summary of the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) entitled "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities.â€[51]

Nov. 27, 2007: Iranian Defense Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar reports the building of the Ashura missile. The missile has a range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km).[52]

Nov. 10, 2007: Commander Gholamreza Karimi of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards asserts, "In the near future, the artillery and missiles of the [Islamic Revolutionary] Guards Corps will undergo a great transformation as far as technique, tactics and technology are concerned."[53]

Sept. 22, 2007: Deputy Head of the Iranian Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff for Logistics and Industrial Research Brig. Gen. Mohammad Reza Naqdi says that several training and military aircraft, transportation planes, different kinds of helicopters, the Shahab-3 missiles with horizontal charge and Fateh-3 missiles have been produced in Iran. He asserts that the horizontal charge model of Shahab-3's functioning time has been drastically reduced compared to the former type. Naqdi adds that the Fateh-3 missile is also known for the high degree of precision with which it can hit targets.[54]

Sept. 22, 2007: Iran displays the "Qadr-1" missile and its launcher in its armed forces parade. The Qadr-1 is a ballistic missile with a warhead and an explosive. It has the capacity to travel 310 miles (500 km) more than the Shahab-3.[55]

Sept. 18, 2007: Iran threatens to fire long-range missiles at American targets in the Middle East should the United States launch an attack against Iran. A senior commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Gen. Mohammed Hassan Koussechi, warns, "If the United States is saying that they have identified 2,000 targets in Iran, then what is certain is that it is the Americans who are all around Iran and are equally our targets. We have reached capacities that allow us to hit the enemy at a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,240 miles)."[56]

Aug. 30, 2007: El Baradei circulates among the IAEA Board of Governors his latest report, “Implementation of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,†which covers developments since the report of May 23, 2007. It finds that Iran has not suspended enrichment-related activities and is continuing its construction of a Fuel Enrichment Plant and a heavy-water reactor at Natanz and Arak, respectively. The report also finds that the IAEA is uncertain as to the scope and nature of Iran’s nuclear program.[57]

Aug. 22, 2007: Iran develops a remote-controlled launch system that can be used to operate dozens of unmanned Shahab-3 ballistic missile launchers in underground bunkers. After recent upgrades, the Shahab-3 ballistic missiles in Iran's possession may have a target range of 1,240 miles (2,000 km).[58]

June 22, 2007: The IAEA and Iran agree to draft a plan of action to address outstanding concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program.[59]

June 11, 2007: Deputy Interior Minister of Iran Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr warns, "All American bases in the region are within the reach of our weapons. If the United States attacked Iran, U.S. interests would be in danger everywhere in the world." Iran has an array of medium-range missiles and claims that its longer-range Shahab-3 missile has a reach of 1,240 miles (2,000 km), which would put U.S. bases on the Arabian Peninsula within reach.[60]

June 10, 2007: Admiral Ali Shamkhani, senior defense adviser to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, warns that Gulf States providing the United States with military cooperation will be key targets of a barrage of retaliatory ballistic missiles. Shamkhani stresses that missiles will be launched at both U.S. military bases and strategic targets such as oil refineries and power stations in the event of such an attack against Iran. The attacks on Arab states will be in addition to air strikes on Israel, which have been threatened in the past.[61]

May 23, 2007: An IAEA report discloses that despite diplomatic efforts to suspend Iran's enrichment-related activities, Iran continues to proceed with its nuclear program. The report, issued by the IAEA director general, reveals the following:[62]

• Since Feb. 22, 2007 Iran has continued to test cascade machines – a group of centrifuge machines connected in a series – at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP);[63]

• Iran continues to install centrifuges - machines used to separate materials of different density - despite its agreements to suspend the import, manufacture and use of P-1 and P-2 centrifuge components in 2004;[64]

• Iran has fed approximately 572 lbs. (260 kg) of UF6 (uranium hexafluoride - also fuel for nuclear reactors) into the cascades at the PFEP;[65]

• Since April 13, 2007, Iran has not provided the IAEA access to the Arak reactor site to carry out inspections;[66]

• Despite IAEA safeguards and UN sanctions requiring Iran to suspend its heavy- water production, satellite imagery indicates that it continues to engage in such activity;[67]

• Iran has not agreed to any of the required transparency measures that are essential to clarify certain aspects of the scope and nature of its nuclear program. These measures include providing information to the agency concerning alleged studies on the conversion of uranium dioxide into UF4, high explosives testing, and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle. [68]

May 17, 2007: North Korea is suspected to have used a launch-pad in Iran to test a new missile capable of hitting American bases in the Pacific island of Guam. The missile, named after the Musudan testing range in North Korea, had been shown off to the public at a vast military parade in the capital of Pyongyang. If the test did take place, it could have been a quid pro quo for North Korea's alleged agreement to share with Tehran the results of the nuclear test it carried out in October 2006.[69]

May 16, 2007: The U.S. State Department estimates Iran could acquire long-range ballistic missiles capable of striking Europe and the United States in fewer than eight years. The State Department report stresses that foreign assistance could be a key determinant in how quickly Iran progresses, citing the 2006 purchase of 18 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from North Korea modeled after the reverse-engineered Russian SS-N-6 'Serb' (R-27) submarine-launched ballistic missile.[70]

May 10, 2007: Russian Army Chief of General Staff Yuriy Baluyevskiy asserts that Iran possesses only the liquid fuel missile Shahab-3, whose range doesn’t exceed 930 miles (1,500 km) if carrying a warhead up to 1,110 pounds (500 kg). Baluyevskiy stresses that this missile can only reach as far as Israel, thus claims of a threat posed to America and Europe are "extremely overstated." Baluyevskiy concludes that in order to create a ballistic missile with a range of at least 1,860 miles (3,000 km), Iran needs a principally different level of technology and much bigger industrial capacities. According to Baluyevskiy, "[There is only] a chance in a thousand that Iran will soon be able to build missile capabilities to reach Europe and all the more the USA."[71]

March 24, 2007: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1747, reaffirming that Iran shall, without further delay, take the steps required to build confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear program, including suspending all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities as well as heavy water related projects. The resolution also encourages all states to take the necessary measures to prevent the supply, sale or transfer of all "items, materials, equipment, goods and technology, which could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related activities.â€[72]

March 16, 2007: Lieut. Gen. Henry Obering, the U.S. general in charge of deploying an anti-ballistic missile shield in Europe, says such a shield would be operational by 2011 to provide protection to most of the continent against any possible threats from Iran. In comments made to reporters in Berlin, Obering stresses that the planned 10 interceptor missiles in Poland are meant to protect Europe and the U.S. from a possible missile attack from Iran. Russian officials indicate their disdain and the head of Russia’s Missile Fleet warns that such a base in Poland could be targeted if it any way threatens Russian security.

The planned operation date relies on Obering's prediction that negotiations to deploy parts of the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic will conclude by the end of 2007. A delay would make the United States and Europe vulnerable to possible attack from Iran as, according to Obering, Tehran is likely to reach "long-range, intermediate or intercontinental ballistic missile capability" within eight years.[73] Said Obering, “We are very much concerned about the capability of the Iranians to reach almost all of Europe by that point and certainly they may also be able to reach the United States.â€[74]

March 7, 2007: El Baradei states that Iran's actions "render the Agency unable to provide the required assurance about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program." The IAEA's "confidence about the nature of Iran's program has been shaken [and] will only be restored when Iran takes the long overdue decision to explain and answer all the Agency's questions and concerns about its past nuclear activities in an open and transparent manner."[75]

Jan. 30, 2007: U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly indicates in a speech to the George C. Marshall Institute that the Pentagon predicts that Iran will develop an intercontinental ballistic missile with the ability to reach the United States by 2015. O’Reilly cites Iran’s recent plans to build a space launcher, stressing that this capability would aid in the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Pentagon, he says, is in the stages of creating a “multiple kill vehicle†that could defend against 10 or more enemy warheads from a single booster.[76]

Dec. 27, 2006: The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1737, demanding that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.[77]

June 6, 2006: Iran is offered a new proposal on its controversial nuclear program. Although the specifics of the proposal are not unveiled, the offer is known to include economic, technological and political incentives. The offer is believed to include a commitment from the P-5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) to: help Iran build light-water power plants through joint projects; support Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization; and a U.S. pledge to lift certain economic sanctions against Iran to allow the purchase of agricultural appliances and Boeing aircraft parts.

Concerning uranium enrichment - a major point of contention - the proposal requires Iran to suspend all enrichment-related activities; however, this requirement does not preclude the future possibility that Iran could eventually develop indigenous enrichment capabilities once all outstanding questions have been resolved and international confidence has been restored in the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Iran's response is cautious. Ali Larijani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, states that "the proposals contain positive steps and also some ambiguities which should be removed."[78]

May 31, 2006: In an apparent policy shift, the United States announces its intention to directly participate in negotiations provided that Tehran suspends all enrichment and reprocessing activities. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice says, “To underscore our commitment to a diplomatic solution and to enhance the prospects of success, as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the United States will come to the table with our EU-3 colleagues and meet with Iran's representatives.â€[79]

May 9, 2006: In an effort to forge UN Security Council unity, the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany agree to delay UNSC action and postpone voting on a resolution drafted by France and the United Kingdom. Instead, the representatives of the EU-3 will work on devising a comprehensive package of incentives and disincentives to bring Iran to the negotiating table.[80]

May 3, 2006: Britain and France present their draft Security Council resolution, which calls on Iran to "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development...and suspend the construction of a reactor moderated by heavy water." The resolution also urges states to restrict nuclear trade with Iran by "preventing the transfer of items, materials, goods and technology that could contribute to Iran's enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and missile programs." While the resolution does not specify punitive actions in the case of Iran's noncompliance, by citing Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it leaves the door open for possible sanctions and other enforcement measures.[81]

April 29, 2006: The Iranians indicate their willingness to allow greater access to IAEA inspectors under the condition that the Security Council returns the case to the IAEA Board of Governors.[82]

April 28, 2006: The director general of the IAEA submits his report on Iran to the IAEA Board and the Security Council as requested by the March 29 Security Council presidential statement. As in previous reports, the director general cannot provide evidence to verify that Iran's nuclear program is intended exclusively for peaceful purposes.[83]

April 23, 2006: Iran's foreign ministry spokesman, Hamid-Reza Asefi, declares that Iran's nuclear activities are "irreversible." He also states that the Iranians are "determined not to give up our rights to nuclear energy, and suspension of relevant activities are not on our agenda."[84]

April 11, 2006: Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announces that Iran has successfully enriched uranium. He states that Iran has officially "joined the group of those countries which have nuclear technology."[85]

March 29, 2006: The Security Council issues a Presidential Statement calling on Iran to reestablish full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development. The statement also requests the director general of the IAEA to report back within 30 days on Iranian compliance with the steps required by the Board.[86]

March 20, 2006: The five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany meet in Berlin to discuss the Iranian nuclear issue. The EU-3 and United States push for a Security Council statement that would call on Iran to reinstate full suspension of all enrichment related activities. While the EU-3, backed by the US, urges the statement to specify a deadline by which the director general of the IAEA would be required to report back to the Security Council on Iran's compliance, China and Russia express their reservations about imposing an immediate deadline.[87]

March 8, 2006: In his remarks at the conclusion of the IAEA Board meeting, Director General El Baradei emphasizes the importance of finding a comprehensive political settlement, stating that it is entirely up to the Security Council to decide when to take up the issue of Iran's nuclear program, and if it decides to at all, what action it deems necessary.[88]

Feb. 27, 2006: Director General El Baradei issues a report for consideration at the Board of Governors' meeting on March 6, 2006. The report provides an update on the developments of Iran’s nuclear program since November 2005. It states that although the IAEA has not seen indications of diversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, uncertainties remain about the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear program.[89]

Feb. 7, 2006: Iran requests the IAEA to remove the seals and surveillance systems from safeguarded Iranian facilities.[90]

Feb. 4, 2006: The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution requesting the Agency's director general, Mohamed El Baradei, share all IAEA reports and resolutions relating to the Iran's nuclear program with the UN Security Council.[91]

Jan. 31, 2006: The IAEA Deputy Director General for Safeguards submits an updated brief about the latest developments on the implementation of the safeguard agreements. According to the brief, Iran handed over a document dealing with uranium metal that is related to the production of nuclear weapons components.[92]

Jan. 18, 2006: The representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom to the IAEA send a letter to the chair of the IAEA Board of Governors requesting that a special meeting be held to discuss the implementation of IAEA safeguards in Iran and resolutions related to Iran. The special meeting is scheduled for Feb. 2.[93]

Jan. 10, 2006: Despite continuous requests to suspend its activities, Iran removes IAEA seals on enrichment-related equipment and material at Natanz and at two related storage and testing locations, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique.[94]

Jan. 8, 2006: The Secretariat receives a note verbale from the Permanent Mission of Iran stating that the "intended scale of R&D is small" and that "all reprocessing in relation to this small scale R&D will be carried out."[95]

Jan. 7, 2006: Iran requests that the IAEA remove 52 Agency seals installed at the facilities of Natanz, Pars Trash, and Farayand Technique before Jan. 9, 2006.[96]

Jan. 3, 2006: IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei informs the Board of Governors that Iran has decided to resume "R&D activities on the peaceful nuclear energy program which has been suspended as part of its expanded voluntary and non-legally binding suspension.â€[97]

Nov. 27, 2005: The United Kingdom, France, and Germany (the EU-3) agree to hold talks with Iran on resuming negotiations on the country's disputed nuclear program, which broke down in August 2005. As a precondition, Iran must be ready to discuss a Russian proposal allowing Iran to maintain a civilian nuclear program but without uranium enrichment capabilities. Uranium enrichment, the most sensitive stage of the nuclear fuel cycle that can be used to make fuel for bombs, would be transferred to Russia under a joint venture.[98]

Nov. 24-25, 2005: The Director General reports to the Board of Governors that Iran has provided additional documentation, permitted interviews with relevant individuals, and allowed further access. While the Agency intends to continue its efforts to clarify the extent and nature of Iran's nuclear program, Iran is urged to cooperate further on the scope and chronology of its centrifuge enrichment program. However, the Agency observes no deviations from Iran's voluntary suspension of enrichment activities, and the Board adopts no resolution on the issue.[99]

Nov. 21, 2005: Iranian lawmakers vote to oblige their government to stop allowing snap UN checks of its atomic sites and to resume uranium enrichment if Tehran is referred to the UN Security Council for possible sanctions.[100]

Sept. 24, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that finds Iran's failures and breaches to constitute non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreements and calls on Iran to return to the negotiating process.[101]

Sept. 2, 2005: After the IAEA conducts environmental tests, samples reveal types of nuclear testing that Iran did not include in its inventory of declared nuclear material, calling into question the completeness of Iran's declarations about its centrifuge enrichment activities. The IAEA continues to urge Iran to suspend its enrichment-related activities, including the production of nuclear materials.[102]

Aug. 11, 2005: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that urges Iran to re-establish full suspension of all enrichment-related activities and to re-instate the IAEA seals that were removed at its uranium conversion facility (UCF) in Esfahan.[103]

Aug. 10, 2005: Iran begins to remove the seals on the process lines and the UF4 at the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan. IAEA Director General El Baradei calls for maximum restraint, no unilateral actions, and continued negotiations by all parties. [104]

Aug. 8, 2005: Iran begins feeding uranium ore concentrate into the first part of the process line at the uranium conversion facility.[105]

Aug. 1, 2005: Iran notifies the IAEA that it has decided to resume the uranium conversion activities at the uranium conversion facility in Esfahan.[106]

Nov. 29, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that welcomes Iran's voluntary decision to "continue and extend its suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities." The Board also expresses "its strong concern that Iran's policy of concealment up to October 2003 has resulted in many breaches of Iran's obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement."[107]

Nov. 25, 2004: Director General El Baradei reports to the Board of Governors that two important issues remain: the origin of the low-enriched and highly enriched uranium particle contamination found at various locations in Iran and the extent of Iran's efforts to import, manufacture and use centrifuges of both the P-1 and P-2 designs.[108]

Sept. 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution stating it "deeply regrets" that Iran's suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities "fell significantly short of the Agency's understandings of those commitments."[109]

June 18, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution that deplores Iran's lack of timely cooperation with the IAEA and failure to act in full compliance with its safeguards obligations.[110]

June 1, 2004: Director General El Baradei, in his report to the Board of Governors, identifies three outstanding concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program: the origin of highly enriched uranium at several nuclear sites; previously undeclared centrifuge technology; and Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.[111]

May 21, 2004: Iran submits its initial declaration under the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement.[112]

May 18, 2004: Iran sends a letter to the IAEA clarifying the suspension agreement, stating, "Iran has not, at any time, made any undertaking not to produce feed material for the enrichment process. The decision taken for voluntary and temporary suspension is based on clearly defined scope which does not include suspension of production of UF6." The IAEA disagrees with Iran’s analysis.[113]

April 7, 2004: During a visit to Iran, Director General El Baradei announces that Iran has agreed to accelerate its cooperation with the IAEA in addition to a joint action plan with a timetable to deal with outstanding issues.[114]

March 15, 2004: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the IAEA's verification of Iran's nuclear program, noting "outstanding issues" and questions, and requesting Director General El Baradei to report back to the Board on these matters before the end of May.[115]

March 8, 2004: Director General El Baradei expresses his concern to the Board of Governors that Iran's declaration of Oct. 21, 2003 did not include any reference to its possession of P-2 centrifuge designs and related research and development, which he views as a setback to Iran's stated policy of transparency.[116]

Dec. 18, 2003: Iran signs the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, granting IAEA inspectors greater authority in verifying the country's nuclear program.[117]

Nov. 26, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution on the implementation of NPT safeguards in the Islamic Republic of Iran.[118]

Nov. 10, 2003: In a letter to the IAEA, Iran's representative conveys his government's acceptance of the text of the Additional Protocol and officially announces that Iran has agreed to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities.[119]

Oct. 31, 2003: Director General El Baradei remarks that the active and intense period of talks and inspections, begun Oct. 2, is making good progress.[120]

Oct. 21, 2003: Iran and the EU-3 agree on measures aimed at settling all outstanding issues. Iran agrees to engage in full cooperation and transparency with the IAEA in order to address and resolve all requirements and outstanding issues while clarifying and correcting any possible failures and deficiencies raised by the IAEA. Furthermore, Iran decides to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, commence ratification procedures for the Protocol, and to voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.[121]

Sept. 12, 2003: The Board of Governors adopts a resolution calling on Iran to accelerate cooperation with the IAEA and provide full transparency.[122]

Sept. 8-9, 2003: Director General El Baradei urges greater cooperation from Iran in order for the IAEA to complete its verification. El Baradei says, "…it is obviously not sufficient to rely just on the rights granted in the safeguards agreement," and emphasizes the need for "full transparency and proactive co-operation by Iran."[123]

July 9, 2003: Director General El Baradei meets with Iranian President Khatami; they agree that a team of senior IAEA experts will remain in Iran to hold technical discussions with Iranian experts on outstanding issues.[124]

June 16-20, 2003: The Board of Governors discusses allegations made in a report by Director General El Baradei that Iran has failed to meet its obligations under its safeguards agreements.[125]

Feb. 22-23, 2003: El Baradei leads an IAEA delegation to Iran and discovers that Iran has two undeclared nuclear production facilities in Natanz and an undeclared enrichment facility, laboratory, and storage facility in Tehran, and that it is building more production facilities in Arak and Esfahan.[126]

Sept. 2002: Iran tells the IAEA of its plans to advance its nuclear program, specifically that it is "embarking on a long-term plan to construct nuclear power plants with a total capacity of 6,000 MW (megawatts) within two decades."[127]

Expert Sources on Iran (United States and Israel)

In the United States:

David Albright, President, Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS)
Tel: 202-547-3633; E-mail: albright@isis-online.org

Ilan Berman, Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council;
author, "Tehran Rising: Iran's Challenge to the United States" (2005);
Tel: 202-543-1006 (office); http://www.afpc.org/berman.shtml

Debra Burlingame, Sister of Charles F. "Chic" Burlingame, III, pilot of American Airlines Flight 77 that crashed into the Pentagon on 9/11; Co-founder, 9/11 Families for a Safe and Strong America; Director, World Trade Center Memorial Foundation; Tel: 914-844-3146; E-mail: db@911familiesforamerica.org

Patrick Clawson, Ph.D., Deputy Director for Research,
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy;
Tel: 202-452-0650 ext. 220 (office), 202-302-1722 (cell);
E-mail: pclawson@washingtoninstitute.org;
Web site: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC10.php?CID=10

Frank Gaffney, President, The Center for Security Policy and Founder, DivestTerror.org;
E-mail: gaffney@centerforsecuritypolicy.org;
Web site: www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org

Andrew Grotto, Senior National Security Analyst, Center for American Progress; Tel: 202-682-1611 (office);
E-mail: agrotto@americanprogress.org

Larry Haas, Visiting Senior Fellow, Georgetown Public Policy Institute;
Tel: 202-257-9592 (cell); www.larryhaasonline.com

Sam Kermanian, Secretary General, Iranian American Jewish Federation;
Tel: 310-854-1199 (office, direct); E-mail: skermanian@tradeattache.com

Orde Kittrie, Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University;
Tel: 480-727-8572 (office); E-mail: orde.kittrie@asu.edu

Dr. Michael Ledeen, Freedom Scholar, Foundation for Defense of Democracies;
Contact through Judy Mayka, Tel: 202-621-3948; E-mail: Judy@defenddemocracy.org

Valerie Lincy, Editor, Iranwatch.org;
Tel: 202-223-8299 (office); E-mail: valerie@wisconsinproject.org; http://www.iranwatch.org/

Claire Lopez, Consultant and Former Executive Director, Iran Policy Committee;
Tel: 703-583-9573 (office); E-mail: clairelopez@gmail.com

Cliff May, President and Executive Director, The Foundation for the Defense of Democracies;
Contact through Judy Mayka, Tel: 202-621-3948; E-mail: Judy@defenddemocracy.org

Lily Mazahery, President, Legal Rights Institute
Tel: 202- 834-7150; E-mail: lmazahery@gmail.com

Gary Milhollin, Executive Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control;
Tel: 202-223-8299 (office); E-mail: info@wisconsinproject.org

Jennifer Laszlo Mizrahi, Founder and President, The Israel Project;
Tel: 202-857-6644 (office); www.theisraelproject.org

Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute;
Tel: 202-862-5851 (office); Fax: 202-862-4877; E-mail: mrubin@aei.org

Rick Santorum, Former U.S. Senator (R-Penn.), Senior Fellow of the Ethics and Public Policy Center; Contact Virginia Davis, Cell: 215-528-9368; Home office: 610-658-9658; E-mail: virginiad@ricksantorum.com, virginiadavis05@gmail.com

U.S. Rep. Brad Sherman, D-Calif., Chairman, International Terrorism, Non-Proliferation & Trade Committee;
Tel: 202-225-5911 (office); www.house.gov/sherman/about

Ken Timmerman, President, Middle East Data Project, Inc.;
Author, “Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran†(2005);
Tel: 301-946-2918 (office); E-mail: timmerman.road@verizon.net; www.KenTimmerman.com

Peter Zimmerman, Professor Emeritus, King's College, London
Tel: 703-966-6680; peter.zimmerman@cox.net

In Israel:

Dr. Ronen Bergman, Senior Security and Intelligence Correspondent, Yedioth Ahronoth;
author, "Point of No Return (2007); Tel: 011-972-2-555-8148 (cell); E-mail: rbergman@netvision.net.il; www.thesecretwarwithiran.com

Amb. Jeremy Issacharoff, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of National Security Studies;
Tel: 011-972-3- 640-0400 ext 463 (work); Tel: 011-972-50-620-3887 (cell); E-mail: jeremyi@inss.org.il

Professor Ze'ev Maghen, Lecturer in the History of the Middle East, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University;
Tel: 011-972-3-531-7812 (office); 011-972-52-383-4069 (cell); E-mail: maghenz@netvision.net.il;
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa

David Menashri, Chair of Modern Iranian Studies, Tel Aviv University;
Tel: 011-972-3-640-8911 or 011-972-3-640-6161 (office); 011-972-8-940-1467 (home);
E-mail: menashri@post.tau.ac.il


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Footnotes:

[1] Black, Ian, “Barack Obama: Iran faces fresh nuclear sanctions within weeks,†The Guardian (UK), Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/nov/19/obama-iran-nuclear-sanctions

[2] Ibid.

[3] Donigin, William and Erdbrink, Thomas, “World leaders to meet on Iran's failure to halt nuclear program,†The Washington Post, Nov. 19,2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/19/AR2009111901847.html

[4] Pouladi, Farhad, “Iran rejects UN-drafted nuclear fuel deal,†AFP, Nov. 18, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j_fsdcGFWIyeVEBIOrxvpon9ApIA

[5] “Sanctions on Iran likely to yield mixed results amid tense nuke talks,†Kyodo News, Nov. 19, 2009, http://home.kyodo.co.jp/modules/fstStory/index.php?storyid=471654

[6] Heinrich, Mark, “Iran revelation could mean more secret sites—IAEA,†Reuters, Nov. 16, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/hotStocksNews/idUSVIE00346120091116

[7] Tirone, Jonathan, “Iran Raises Uranium Output as Photos Show Need for Wider Checks,†Bloomberg News, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aMtzNb9WS83I&pos=9

[8] "Iranian diplomat denies nuclear weapons program," CNN, Dec. 13, 2002, http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/12/13/zarif.transcript/index.html

[9] Johnson, Zachary K., “Iran going nuclear, background to a crisis,†Frontline World, May 2005, retrieved July 13, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iran403/background.html  

[10] H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, "Statement at the 46th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency," IAEA, Sept.16, 2006, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/iran_timeline.shtml#september02  

[11] Report by the Director General, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," IAEA, Sept. 2, 2005, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2005/gov2005-67.pdf 

[12] Wahab, Siraj and Al-Saadi, Samir: “We´ll Pressure Iran on Nuke," Arab News, Oct. 29, 2007, http://www.arabnews.com/services/print/print.asp?artid=102963&d=29&m=10&y=2007&hl='We'll%20Pressure%20Iran%20on%20Nuke

[13] “Merkel: Iran our grave security concern,†PressTV, Dec. 27, 2007

[14] Broad, William and David Sanger, "Meeting on arms data reignites Iran debate," The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login  

[15] Broad, William and David Sanger, "Meeting on arms data reignites Iran debate," The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login  

[16] "Iran tests missiles, state media reports," Reuters, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-iran-missiles-test.html?hp

[17] “Tests for Iranian Bomb – Tehran,†Intelligence Online, Mar. 13, 2008.

[18] “Tests for Iranian Bomb – Tehran,†Intelligence Online, Mar. 13, 2008.

[19] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[20] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[21] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[22] Gjelten, Tom, "Iran NIE Reopens Intelligence Debate," NPR, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18177103

[23] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf ; Omestad,Thomas, “Intelligence Chief Reshapes Iran NIE,†U.S. News and World Report, Feb. 6, 2008.

[24] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[25] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[26] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[27] “Iran: nuclear intentions and capabilities,†National Intelligence Council, retrieved July 9, 2008 from www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf  

[28] Bar, Shmuel, “Iran: cultural values, self images, and negotiation behavior,†Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference, Oct. 2004, retrieved July 13, 2008 from www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2614Iranianself.pdf  

[29] Bar, Shmuel, “Iran: cultural values, self images, and negotiation behavior,†Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference, Oct. 2004, retrieved July 13, 2008 from www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2614Iranianself.pdf  

[30] Bar, Shmuel, “Iran: cultural values, self images, and negotiation behavior,†Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference, Oct. 2004, retrieved July 13, 2008 from www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2614Iranianself.pdf  

[31] Bar, Shmuel, “Iran: cultural values, self images, and negotiation behavior,†Institute for Policy and Strategy, Herzliya Conference, Oct. 2004, retrieved July 13, 2008 from www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/2614Iranianself.pdf  

[32] Pollack, Kenneth. 2004. "The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America," New York: Random House; Ledeen, Michael A. 2007. The Iranian Time Bomb. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

[33] Pollack, Kenneth. 2004. "The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America," New York: Random House; Ledeen, Michael A. 2007. The Iranian Time Bomb. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

[34] Jahn, George, "Diplomats: Iran improves access to nuke activities," AP, Aug. 21, 2009, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iijfYgMUu7W_-ZKg8BjH5QNTww5QD9A6O2MO2

[35] Albright, David, Shire, Jacqueline, “ IAEA Report on Iran Centrifuge and LEU increases; access to Arak reactor denied; no progress on outstanding issues,†Institute for Science and International Security, June 5, 2009, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_IAEA_Report_Analysis_5June2009.pdf

[36] Albright, David, Shire, Jacqueline, “ IAEA Report on Iran Centrifuge and LEU increases; access to Arak reactor denied; no progress on outstanding issues,†Institute for Science and International Security, June 5, 2009, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_IAEA_Report_Analysis_5June2009.pdf

[37] Albright, David, Shire, Jacqueline, “ IAEA Report on Iran Centrifuge and LEU increases; access to Arak reactor denied; no progress on outstanding issues,†Institute for Science and International Security, June 5, 2009, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/Iran_IAEA_Report_Analysis_5June2009.pdf

[38] Broad, William, Sanger, David, “Iran Has More Enriched Uranium Than Thought,†The New York Times, February 19, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/world/middleeast/20nuke.html

[39] Albright, David, Shire, Jacqueline, Brannan, Paul, “IAEA Report on Iran: Centrifuge Operation Significantly Improving; Gridlock on Alleged Weaponization Issues,†Institute for Science and International Security, Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/ISIS_Report_Iran_15September2008.pdf

[40] "Iran tests missiles, state media reports," Reuters, July 9, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/world/international-iran-missiles-test.html?hp  

[41] Sciolino, Elaine, “Iran responds obliquely to nuclear plan,†The New York Times, July 5, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/05/world/middleeast/05iran.html?_r=1&oref=slogin 

[42] “Communication dated 16 June 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency concerning the text of the "Islamic Republic of Iran's proposed package for constructive negotiation," IAEA Information Circular, June 18, 2008, http://www.iaea.org

[43] “Text of diplomatic offer to Iran,†June 16, 2008, http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/Diplomatic_Offer_16June2008.pdf 

[44] “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security
Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iranâ€

[45] “Iran holds back nuclear details, IAEA says,†CNN.com, May 26, 2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/05/26/iran.nuclear/index.html

[46] “Communication dated Mar. 26, 2008 received from the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency,†International Atomic Energy Agency, Mar. 28, 2008, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc724.pdf

[47] “Resolution 1803,†United Nationals Security Council, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm 

[48] Broad, William and David Sanger, "Meeting on arms data reignites Iran debate," The New York Times, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/03/world/middleeast/03nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login 

[49] “Tests for Iranian Bomb – Tehran,†Intelligence Online, Mar. 13, 2008.

[50] Kulish, Nicholas, “Agreement on proposal for new Iran sanctions,†The New York Times, Jan. 23, 2008

[51] Spector, Leonard S., “Iranian Nuclear Program Remains Major Threat Despite Partial Freeze of Weapons-Relevant Activities Described in New U.S. National Intelligence Estimate,†James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies,†retrieved July 13, 2008 from http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/071206.htm

[52] "Iran builds 2,000 km-range Ashura Missile - defense minister," Fars News Agency, 27 November 2007; "Iran adds Ashura to Missile Lineup," Jane's Defense Weekly, Nov. 28, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,†Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.htm

[53] “Latest transformations concerning the Guards Corps acquiring artillery, new military missiles,†Hemayat, Nov. 10, 2007; “Iran able to build missiles with more than 2,000-km range, says MP,†Fars News Agency, Nov. 11, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,†Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html

[54] "Iranian armed forces official outlines weapons production achievements," Iranian News Agency (IRNA), Sep. 22, 2007 via “Missile Chronology,†Nuclear Threat Initiative, retrieved July, 13, 2008 from http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/1788_6350.html 

[55] "Iran displays Qadr-1 missile at


© 2000 - 2019 Al Bawaba (www.albawaba.com)

You may also like