The latest events in Yemen came as a surprise to us, and, like the majority of the surprises in the past few years, it was not a pleasant one – rather, it was both worrying and confusing.
During 2011 and 2012, Yemen’s course of events seemed similar to Tunisia’s. It’s true that the abdication of Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh took a longer time and cost more lives, but the situation, thanks to the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the cooperation of the Security Council, was heading toward a promising transitional phase.
What happened in Yemen hadn’t happened in any of the other Arab countries that witnessed revolutions: a comprehensive national dialogue was held, in which all parties participated, including political parties involved in the southern Yemen insurgency, the Houthis and the party of the former president.
The dialogue dragged on and branched out, but it resulted in an almost unanimous decision about the need for decentralization and the establishment of new provinces, as well as the federalist and democratic nature of the system, and the level of participation by all sides.
However, after that, the dialogue faltered, and deadlines were not met. And we knew by asking the Yemenis we are in contact with that some of the GCC’s decrees weren’t implemented (the restructuring of the army and security forces, for example), and that some of the sides who participated in the dialogue later objected to some of its outcomes.
Then events took a turn for the worse, with the fall of the Amran governorate, the fall of Sanaa, and the spread of militants from Hudayda and Hajjah toward the center of Yemen up until Al-Bayda and Marib. All of this, and the army offered no resistance, giving up its bases and weapons to the rebels. Meanwhile the transitional government gave up its responsibilities and resigned, and the president attempted to calm the situation through the peace and partnership agreement, none of which was implemented, just like the agreements forged with Hezbollah after its militants took over Beirut in May 7, 2008.
Maybe it would be beneficial to attempt to answer the confusing questions of what happened: whether parties in the dialogue conspired against their partners and the dialogue itself, why fighting broke out among army troops, why the troops withdrew and whether any of them cooperated with the rebels. But what we think is most important now is to look for a possible way or ways out of the crises that are hitting Yemen today, have already hit Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and might hit another country tomorrow.
Every Arab has an emotional connection with Yemen. In both legend and history, Yemen is the origin of the Arabs. Yemenis comprise a major Arab population in the Arabian Peninsula, approximately 30 million people. On top of that, Yemen occupied a very important strategic location at the meeting point of the Arab Sea, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and is bordered by Saudi Arabia and Oman. Despite its poor resources, rampant tribalism and the weakness of its central authorities, Yemen could boast an important achievement after the Cold War when it united its north and south in 1990.
Since 2004, we have been hearing about the rise of sectarianism and fundamentalism in Yemen, a phenomenon never before witnessed by the country in the last few centuries. Between 2004 and 2010, the Yemeni army waged six wars in the far north of the country against rebels who became known as Houthis. In fact, over the past 10 years, the Yemeni army has had to fight on two fronts: against the Houthis’ rebellion in northern Saada and its surroundings, and against Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula in the center of Yemen and the south.
Today, it is said that the former President Ali Abdullah Saleh (who still exerts a large influence on the army) has allied with the Houthis since 2012 in order to remove his adversaries from power, in preparation for his return to manage the country with the rebels, even if it’s through a coup.
The fear now is not of the return of Saleh or his coup preparations under the pretext of salvaging the situation. The fear is mainly of the breaking up of Yemen into many statelets, and of the threat posed to the security of other Gulf countries and to Arab security in general if Houthis, backed by Iran, reach the southwestern Bab al-Mandeb strait.
We know that the international powers are in the Indian Ocean and in the islands close to Yemen’s shore and the Red Sea. But if Iran, which controls the Strait of Hormuz and any oil shipments that pass through it, gets a foothold in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, this will open up dangerous possibilities related to the security of Egypt, the Gulf and the Arab world generally, as well as affecting the civil wars and sectarian strife in which Iran is involved – Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and Yemen.
Yemen is now exposed and threatened by the separation of the south, and by the civil war in the north and the middle of the country. The Yemeni people are at risk of falling between the terrorism of the Houthis and Al-Qaeda. The biggest fear is that Al-Qaeda acquires an internal function in Yemen, for example protecting Sunnis from Houthi sectarianism.
What to do? Most Yemenis found the internationally backed Gulf initiative to be a solution and way out of the crisis. Then came the national dialogue that could have achieved many things, such as preserving Yemen’s unity, enabling it to progress toward becoming a modern state and getting Arab and international support for growth and development.
It is therefore necessary to go back to the Gulf initiative and for Arabs to pressure the UN Security Council to act. There must also be an Arab initiative that works on uniting the Yemeni army in order to secure Yemeni cities and rid them of illegal weaponry and moves the country toward parliamentary elections that will determine the future and the sizes of political forces, without the influence of arms or the control of militants.
It is still possible to do this, but what will push Houthis to withdraw from the cities they occupy? No one can do this but the army; it’s the army that protected Yemen’s unity in 1994 and it is the only power that wasn’t affected much by sectarian and tribal factors.
Is it possible to take the army away from the influence of the former president? The international envoy Jamal Bin Omar considers this to be possible. But Arabs, especially those from the Gulf, will have to do everything possible to resolve the crisis in Yemen. We must not allow ourselves to stop caring about Yemen’s unity, stability and Arab credentials; if we did so, what has happened in Syria and Iraq might happen in Yemen too.
What happened and is happening in Syria, Yemen, Libya and Iraq is worrying for the Arabs and for Arab national security. But it also invites us, after the failure and splits that have appeared, to think practically and seriously about the future.
We have considered before the possibility of economic, political and strategic Arab integration, and an Arab Court of Justice, but there was no active follow-up process and these ideas were never implemented.
Therefore, we demand today that steps are taken to expand the concept of a joint Arab defense body by discussing the components of regional and Arab security in light of the escalating threats. This includes looking into creating a joint Arab force on land, sea and in the air that protects peace and deters threats to the whole Arab region. We invite the Arab League to study these ideas and work on adopting them and putting them into effect.
Fouad Siniora is Lebanon’s former prime minister and a current member of the Lebanese Parliament. Amr Moussa is an Egyptian politician and diplomat and former secretary-general of the Arab League.
By Fouad Siniora
