Jihadism has ravaged and remade parts of the Middle East in past decades, while leaving untold casualties around the world. Jihadist groups may be blunted in the region, but their growing presence in Africa indicates that, far from becoming a distant global force, the pulse of jihadism has simply shifted regions.
After 20 years of the global war on jihadism, great-power rivalry now defines the foreign policy of Western governments. Such change reflects the retreat of jihadism in the Middle East but neglects its swell in the Sahel.
This was exemplified by President Macron’s recent announcement to withdraw troops from Mali, a country whose lengthy jihadist insurgency has caused thousands of deaths and driven hundreds of thousands from their homes. Like America’s departure from Afghanistan, France is occupied with other foreign policy issues – namely, war in Europe.
This was exemplified by President Macron’s recent announcement to withdraw troops from Mali, a country whose lengthy jihadist insurgency has caused thousands of deaths and driven hundreds of thousands from their homes.
Burkina Faso, for instance, has almost half of its territory controlled by Isis and Al-Qaeda-linked militias. Just like Mali, this year is set to have the highest death toll for jihadi violence in the country since the crisis began a decade ago; and this insecurity has been the pretext for two successful coups in 2022 alone.
In June, 89 people were killed in a northern village by suspected jihadists.
Meanwhile in Somalia, the president began his second term this October declaring “total war against al Shabaab” after a 30-hour siege in a Mogadishu hotel left 20 casualties. Even militias of farmers are being assembled by a desperate government searching for stability.
It is not just a case of governments versus insurgents; rivalry between jihadi organisations is also a cause of major conflict.
As Global Terrorism Index observed this year: “The situation in the Sahel is rapidly deteriorating, with eight attempted coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea and Chad in the last eighteen months. The underlying drivers are complex and systemic, including poor water utilisation, lack of food, malnutrition, strong population growth, and weak governments.”
Turning to the Middle East, al-Qaida returned to global consciousness in August in an event which spoke of its undoing: the death of its leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The meeting of two Hellfire missiles on an unsuspecting al-Zawahiri on a balcony fronted onto a street in Kabul confirmed the end of an era for the organisation.
Under the former Egyptian doctor, al-Qaida was content to stave off its decline and slowly restore the organisation while the dizzying rise of ISIS exhausted global and regional attention.
Al-Qaida ceded its position as the world’s foremost jihadist organisation to ISIS. The audacious action and success of the latter placed into sharp relief for many jihadis the lameness of the former; however, since ISIS’s caliphate came to an abrupt end, many have reconsidered al-Qaida in a more charitable light.
Al-Qaida’s expectation that 9/11 would kindle a revolutionary period of US retreat from the Middle East and the ensuing defeat of weakened autocrats to an unassailable tide of jihadism, remains abstract. Moreover, its central leadership has been impotent since 2002 when it executed its last successful act of international terrorism in Mombasa, Kenya.
The global jihad summoned by the likes of bin Laden has retreated back into the localised jihadism typical of mid to late 20th century.
However, a victory for the organisation has been its strengthening presence in Africa by inspiring and empowering various al-Qaida franchises.
The presences of al-Shabaab and Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), in East Africa and the Sahel, are robust. But the relative success of these organisations has been achieved through their autonomy, which has sacrificed al-Qaida’s global influence. This is also true of ISIS’s franchises, like Boko Haram in Nigeria, who compliment ISIS’s global agenda but over which the group has no direct operational control.
The global jihad summoned by the likes of bin Laden has retreated back into the localised jihadism typical of mid to late 20th century.
The return of Taliban governance in Afghanistan might improve al-Qaeda’s fortunes; al-Zawahiri’s residence in Kabul revealed its intimacy with certain elements in the Taliban leadership. But regardless, its aspirations will be hobbled by the organisation’s limited capacity.
Drawn from remnants of al-Qaida, ISIS persists in a similarly faded state.
In January, the group re-seized media attention through an assault on the al-Sinaa prison in Hasaka, Syria to liberate many of its militants, leaving hundreds dead. This led to heavy speculation that this was evidence of ISIS’s resurgence and its unbending threat.
However, such concerns were eased a matter of days later when its leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, was killed in a daring U.S. special operations raid.
However, such concerns were eased a matter of days later when its leader, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, was killed in a daring U.S. special operations raid.
The infamous al-Hol camp in northeast Syria is widely seen as a lifeline for ISIS on account of its ripe conditions for exploitation. As observed by Army Gen. Michael Kurilla, the commander of U.S. Central Command, it “is a literal breeding ground for the next generation of ISIS.”
Such concern informed the Biden administration’s recent announcement of renewed efforts to reduce its population through repatriation.
The upkeep of counterterrorism pressure, led by Western forces, has been a decisive factor preventing an ISIS resurgence. However, with conflict now swamping or threatening to emerge in other parts of the globe, its longevity is doubtful.
Jihadism in the Middle East was spawned in repressive and dysfunctional societies. The continuity of broken governance in the region, but now more pressingly in the Sahel, offers ample inspiration and opportunity for its trends to survive and even surge.
