ALBAWABA - Israel's public broadcaster, Kan, has reported new information indicating that Israeli intelligence picked up on unusual Hamas movements within Gaza less than a day before the October 7, 2023 attack. These warnings, however, were apparently disregarded by military command.
Kan reported that Israeli forces conducted a specific drone surveillance mission on October 6th. The operation's target was Hamas guards, who were positioned near a tunnel. This tunnel was thought to contain Avera Mengistu, an Israeli citizen. Mengistu had entered Gaza in 2014 and was held captive for almost ten years, until his release earlier this year.
Analysts, during the operation, flagged certain behaviors that suggested a possible immediate threat. The IDF Southern Command received the information, but the commanders assessed the situation differently. They determined that the activity was simply a standard training exercise conducted by Hamas, not a precursor to a large-scale attack.
Kan's report revealed that the operation didn't appear in any official military records. Furthermore, it wasn't mentioned in later inquiries examining the intelligence breakdowns that preceded the October 7 attack. No one has provided a reason for this absence.
These disclosures further complicate the already intense examination of Israeli intelligence evaluations leading up to the assault. Earlier this month, Kan's report indicated that drone surveillance had yielded no useful information about Mengistu, nor had it identified any imminent danger.
Separately, a Channel 12 report from September brought to light that the Mossad, a fortnight before the assault, had produced a comprehensive analysis. This assessment determined that Hamas wasn't actively pursuing a conflict with Israel at that particular moment. The document indicated that Hamas, anticipating potential escalation fueled by concerns about targeted killings, was nonetheless inclined to sidestep a full-blown war.
The Mossad's analysis indicated that Hamas was keeping its military capabilities at a high level, despite efforts to appear restrained. They were sending up incendiary balloons, yet signaling a preference to sidestep open warfare.
The reports, when considered collectively, prompt a more profound examination of Israeli intelligence's assessment of Gaza's signals during the crucial hours before October 7th. They also beg the question of why warnings were disregarded, even as evidence of heightened Hamas preparedness continued to accumulate.
