Dr. Gil Feiler
Abstract
The collapse of the Islamic Republic in Iran would represent a major geopolitical inflection point in the Middle East. Beyond the internal upheavals such a transition would entail, the potential normalization of relations between Iran and Israel would have profound economic, diplomatic, and security implications. This article examines the feasibility and consequences of a close Iran–Israel relationship in a post-Ayatollah era, with attention to the reactions of Arab states and the broader international system.
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been a central antagonist in its relationship with the State of Israel since the 1979 revolution. Hostility has manifested through support for armed proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, anti-Israel rhetoric, and competition for regional influence. Yet, the sudden disappearance of the regime that has perpetuated this antagonism could open new avenues for strategic realignment.
Economic Considerations
A. Trade and Investment Potential
Post-regime Iran and Israel could find economic incentives for rapprochement. Iran’s economy, once diversified and industrialized under the Shah, retains significant potential in energy, petrochemicals, agriculture, and technology. Israel’s economy, with advanced sectors in high tech, water management, and defense technologies, could complement Iranian economic needs. Renewed trade ties might center on:
Energy exports from Iran to global markets via Israeli and Gulf intermediaries.
Technology cooperation in agriculture, water treatment, and renewable energy.
Infrastructure investments by Israeli firms in Iranian transportation and logistics.
B. Sanctions Relief and Capital Flows
A more cooperative Iranian government might seek rapprochement with Western economies, leading to sanctions relief. Israel could act as a gateway for Western capital and markets into Iran, leveraging established financial and commercial networks. Such a shift could stimulate regional supply chains and reduce transaction costs in the Middle East.
Political and Diplomatic Dynamics
A. From Antagonism to Normalization
The transition from hostility to cooperation would require political recalibration on both sides. Key factors include:
Rejection of revolutionary anti-Zionist ideology by new Iranian leadership.
Confidence-building measures, such as diplomatic exchanges and security assurances.
Multilateral frameworks that include Israel and Iran in regional dialogues.
B. Domestic Politics
In Iran, internal political incentives for rapprochement may include economic revival and avoidance of isolation. In Israel, political success of such rapprochement would depend on public perceptions of security guarantees and shared interests.
Arab States: Reactions and Realignments
The Arab world’s response to an Iran–Israel rapprochement would vary:
Gulf Cooperation Council states (e.g., UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) might view normalization positively if it contributes to strategic balance and reduces Iranian support for militant proxies.
Egypt and Jordan, already formal peace partners with Israel, could see economic benefits from broader regional cooperation.
Iraq and Syria, with complex internal dynamics, might react cautiously, balancing domestic constituencies with foreign policy incentives.
Importantly, Arab states may pressure both Tehran and Jerusalem to address shared concerns, such as Palestinian statehood and regional security architectures.
International System Implications
A transformation of Iran–Israel relations could reorder global alignments:
United States and Europe: Could strengthen trans-Atlantic interests in a stable Middle East if rapprochement aligns with broader stability goals.
Russia and China: Might recalibrate their engagements in Iran, but could lose leverage if Iran pivots toward diversified partnerships.
Non-Proliferation: A cooperative relationship might reduce nuclear tensions and enhance arms control mechanisms.
In sum, a rapprochement could contribute to a more multipolar yet less confrontational Middle Eastern order.
Constraints and Challenges
Despite the potential upside, significant barriers remain:
• Trust Deficits: Decades of hostility cannot be erased quickly.
• Non-State Actors: Groups like Hezbollah may resist changes that undermine their political leverage.
Domestic Politics in Both States: Hardliners on both sides may oppose normalization.
These challenges would require sustained diplomacy and institutional frameworks to manage.
Conclusion
The prospect of a close Iran–Israel relationship after the fall of the Ayatollah regime remains speculative but analytically plausible. Economic incentives and geopolitical recalibrations could drive mutual interests, while Arab states’ reactions would shape regional integration. Crucially, such a shift would resonate throughout the international system, influencing power politics, economic networks, and security frameworks. If managed carefully, this hypothetical rapprochement could contribute to a redefined Middle Eastern order with reduced conflict and expanded cooperation.
